We want you to be quite certain,
brothers, about those who have died, to make sure that you do not grieve about
them, like other people who gave no hope. We believe that Jesus died and rose
again and that it will be the same for those who have died in Jesus: God will bring them with him.
Theological roots of fanaticism
Tom Heneghan
It's happened again: a Muslim extremist, angered by the
Charlie Hebdo caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, has beheaded a French
teacher who showed them in class. Samuel Paty was murdered as he left his
school in a suburb of Paris.
And it’s happened again: the French state has launched a
crackdown on Muslim extremists, rounding up contacts of the killer and vowing
to shut down radical groups. It has also reached out to the law-abiding
majority of French Muslims with proposals to create an “enlightened Islam”.
So what will happen next? French leaders have tried and
failed to reshape Islam along more Gallic lines for the past three decades.
Muslim extremists have taken over 250 lives here in the past five years, and
there is no end in sight to the bloody series of killings. Criminals must be
prosecuted; the French justice system is doing that. But so far the strategies
designed to prevent further attacks have failed to address the roots of the
phenomenon.
The French political class looks like a victim of its own
success. In 1905, secularists won a long struggle against the then-powerful
Catholic Church, separating it from the state. The resulting system, known as
laïcité, has since become a template for defending liberté, égalité,
fraternité by keeping religion out of the public sphere. Laïcité basically
worked. Its legalisms could be awkward, at times infuriating, but they set down
guidelines most of the French – whether secularists or people of faith – are
ready to follow.
But laïcité was developed before post-war immigration
resulted in a Muslim minority in France of about five million, the largest in
Europe, which has brought very different political, economic and religious
tensions to those that had divided France 115 years ago. Muslims have not
become invisible in public life. Rich or poor, secular or pious, Muslims stand
out as different, and are perceived as such. There is discrimination, a
sidelined underclass has grown and issues such as women’s headscarves and
dietary laws have become political footballs. And ironically, it is often the
Right, rather than the anticlericalist French Left, who use the rhetoric of
laïcité to denounce public expressions of Islam, from the wearing of burkas to
the building of mosques.
Effectively tackling prejudice and income inequality is
hard. It requires programmes lasting longer than just one legislative cycle,
and laïcité rules out treating any religious group differently. Meanwhile, the
2015 attack on Charlie Hebdo that killed 12 staffers is being relived as a
court in Paris tries 11 sus-
Rallies against terrorism and in support of Samuel Paty were
held across France pected accomplices of the Islamist killers. And last month a
Pakistani immigrant gashed two people with a cleaver outside the satirical
weekly’s former office in supposed revenge for its caricatures. So President
Emmanuel Macron, who faces a re-election challenge from far-right leader Marine
Le Pen in 2022, had a narrow path to walk in reacting to the latest terror
attack.
Calls for an iron hand have come from the far-right and aggression
against mosques and Muslims has increased. Last week two women in headscarves
were stabbed and called “dirty Arabs” as they walked near the Eiffel Tower.
Macron, who chose to be baptised as a Catholic at 12 but now considers himself
to be an agnostic, has a deeper understanding of spirituality than most
politicians. But his strategy for dealing with Muslim extremism sounds like an
updated version of efforts that fell short in the past.
Understandably, his initial reaction focused on security.
“Fear will change sides,” he insisted at an emergency meeting at the Élysée
Palace. “Islamists must not be able to sleep peacefully in this country.” He
has doubled down on the defence of French values, praising Samuel Paty as “the
face of the Republic” in a moving eulogy at the Sorbonne in central Paris. Two
weeks before Paty’s murder, Macron had outlined a broader strategy for dealing
with extremist Islam that he has been working on since coming to office. His
diagnosis is that the problem is “Islamist separatism”. According to a plan due
to be presented as a draft law to the National Assembly in December, he wants
to help create an “enlightened Islam” in France. An Institute of Islamology
will be created to foster better knowledge of Islam and the Arabic language;
imams will have to be trained in France; and home schooling will be severely
restricted to avoid children being “indoctrinated”. Macron admits France has
allowed Muslim ghettos to emerge and ignored warning signs as Islamist
movements – he mentions Wahhabis, Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood – had
“progressively degenerated” into radicalism. But Macron’s plan does not include
concrete measures to counter the prejudice and poverty that leave many Muslims
marginalised.
Adrien Candiard, a 39-year-old French Dominican who lives in
Cairo, where he is a researcher at the Dominican Institute for Oriental
Studies, argues that France cannot understand radical Islamism without
including religion among its sociological and psychological causes. In Du
Fanatisme: Quand la religion est malade (“On Fanaticism: When Religion is
Ill”), Fr Candiard turns a central tenet of laïcité on its head. “Fanaticism is
not the consequence of an excessive presence of God,” he writes, “but the mark
of his absence.”
Secular explanations are not sufficient to explain the
emergence of Islamist violence. In Candiard’s view, Muslim extremists replace
God with idolised versions of his laws that they insist on enforcing. Accusing
a Muslim of shirk (idolatry) is so serious in Islam that radicals believe it
merits death. Candiard does not advocate that outcome, but he uses an Islamic
analysis to show this radicalism is partly a theological problem. This goes
beyond the state’s strictly secular analysis and the routine mainstream Muslim
refrain that extremists “are not real Muslims”.
“Our collective ignorance of the nuts and bolts of theology
leaves us absolutely disarmed when confronted with simplistic or seductive
religious discourse,” Candiard writes. One can only “protect youths from the recruiting
sergeants of jihadism” by giving them serious Islamic arguments to protect them
from being “fooled by the first huckster who uses promises of eternal life to
attract them”.
France needs something more than déjà vu. Macron’s response
to the problem of Islamist violence should go beyond ever-tighter crackdowns
and misguided efforts to reform a religion. The solution is not to focus on
creating an elusive “French Islam” but to address the poverty and
discrimination that create the conditions that foster radicalisation and to
take seriously the theological nature of the religious fanaticism the
extremists embrace.
This article first appeared in The Tablet on 30 October 2020
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