Jesus said to his
disciples:
"Beware that
your hearts do not become drowsy
from carousing
and drunkenness and the anxieties of daily life,
and that day
catch you by surprise like a trap.
For that day will
assault everyone who lives on the face of the earth.
Be vigilant at
all times and pray that you have the strength
to escape the
tribulations that are imminent
and to stand
before the Son of Man."
Luke 21:34 – 36
We
don’t know when and we don’t know how. But if there’s one thing we do know from
astronomy is that the moon, planets, stars and even galaxies have an end. For just
how long the universe waxes and wanes until it finally collapses is known only
to God. For the Christian believer there will come a time, at the end of time
itself, that all humanity, every human being who ever lived, will be called to
account. It’s an unattractive prospect given our meagre three score and ten
that we have been allocated!
And
yet Advent begins as a poignant if energetic, multileveled reminder of,
firstly, the expectation of the arrival of the Christ-child, God-made-flesh;
secondly, the anticipation of the coming Messiah by John (and the Jewish
community); and thirdly, awaiting the second coming of the Messiah (the Parousia).
The early Christian communities had a strong, urgent sense of the imminent
arrival of the Lord, so much so that Paul recommended against marrying
(1Corinthians 7:8). But like our latter day millennialists, Paul was not quite
on the mark. Even greater patience was required.
And
today – with our seemingly embedded postmodern deconstruction of biblical texts
we have rationalised away this vital tension between the ‘now’ and the ‘yet to
come’. The four weeks of Advent remind us of our being human, about our place
in great scheme of things and our deepest need for hope that there is something
more than our brief stay on earth.
Advent is a gift, accept it and live like
you have been promised eternity.
Peter Douglas
With Anti-Semitism on the rise, can Poland come to
terms with its past?
Heroic
and Unheroic Poland
In coming to
terms with a Holocaust that played out on its own soil, Poland has staggered
along a tumultuous path. The country lost more members of the Jewish diaspora
to the Holocaust than any other European nation. Meanwhile, the citizens of
Poland have been forced to reconcile a wide spectrum of attitudes toward their
Jewish compatriots.
When the
Soviet Army “liberated” Poland from its German occupation in 1945, those Jewish
survivors who attempted to return to their homes frequently met with a hostile
curiosity at the very fact that they were still alive. They also faced threats
and sometimes outright attacks. Most infamous was the killing of 42 Jews in the
Kielce Pogrom of July 4, 1946, or that of hundreds in the so-called train
actions (1945-46), in which Jews were pulled from trains by Poles and killed on
the spot. Unlike the actions against Communists by partisans of the Polish
underground, in attacks on Jews Poles targeted also women and children, in a
viciously unheroic display of greed and fear.
When they were
in power, the Polish Communists banned any discussion of the fate of the Polish
Jews, and Jews were often the target of intraparty feuds—most notoriously,
after the events of March 1968, when about 20,000
Jews were forced to leave Poland. It was not until the late 1970s that a
genuine interest in Poland’s Jewish past would begin to arise among a
generation associated with the Solidarity movement. In 1987, Jan Błonski’s essay, “The Poor Poles Look at the
Ghetto” (in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny), famously challenged the
widely held Polish conviction that the Poles were exclusively victims in the
Second World War, and that they had heroically done all in their power to save
Jews. Błonski’s essay
spurred a discussion on Polish-Jewish relations, and some historical works on
the subject followed. Mostly negative reactions to this essay signaled that
Poles were not yet ready for a soul-searching examination of national
conscience.
In 2000,
however, a full decade after the fall of Communism, Jan T. Gross published his
groundbreaking book Neighbors in
Poland (published in the United States in 2001), which permanently altered the
landscape of Polish memory, identity and scholarship on the Holocaust. Gross’s
book described the Polish pogrom of the Jewish inhabitants of Jedwabne in July
1941, shortly after the onset of German-Soviet hostilities. Drawing on
first-person accounts, Gross reconstituted the horrific circumstances: the
wanton murders of Jews around town; their humiliation by forcing them to carry
a monument to Lenin; finally, the mass murder of several hundred Jews, burned
alive in a barn. This pogrom—and its perpetrators—was known to historians as
well as to the local authorities; some of the perpetrators were charged with
crimes and served their sentences after the war.
Nevertheless,
to the average Pole, the fact of this pogrom was something to be neither
confronted nor even acknowledged. Gross himself had remained silent for four
years after discovering the grisly details in eyewitness accounts, for he could
not bring himself to face what had actually happened. A truth like this,
however, could not be pushed aside. Neighbors would
evoke the greatest public debate in free Poland. It inspired the creation of a
prolific line of Polish research, mostly conducted by scholars from the Polish
Center for Holocaust Research in Warsaw. One leading academic, David Engel, has
reported to a conference that “the most cutting-edge Holocaust research is
currently being done in Poland,” where it is focused on Polish-Jewish relations
in the countryside and within the underground.
The debate has
raised the popular consciousness of wartime crimes committed by Polish Gentiles
against Polish Jews. Research performed between 2002 and 2011 has shown that,
while the number of Poles who mostly blame Germans as the perpetrators of
Jedwabne has remained constant at 26 percent, the number of those who mostly
blame Poles has increased from 10 percent to 18 percent. (This correlates to
education level; the higher one’s education level, the more likely one is to
display willingness to see fellow Poles as perpetrators.) An even greater
number of Poles also believed that it was good for Poland for the truth about
the Jedwabne massacre to come out (85 percent in 2011). Unfortunately, the
overall number of Poles who remained utterly ignorant of Jedwabne also grew,
among teenagers in particular, possibly because the massacre is not included in
school curricula.
At the same
time, the higher-level disciplines of Jewish and Holocaust studies have been
booming in Poland, as almost every institution of higher education now offers
courses or sponsors institutes devoted to these areas. Poland’s cultural memory
of its Jewish past has demonstrated an impressive commitment to coming to terms
with its history, so much that it could be perceived as a model of the
self-critical work that other nations, such as Lithuania or Ukraine, have not
yet been able to face. At least, that is how it has appeared until now.
An International Crisis
Many
participants and observers of this historic shift feel that we have been
deluding ourselves that the work of the rectification of the Polish cultural
memory has been mostly achieved. While over the past three years it became
apparent that there were certain setbacks—for example, an increased
polarization along pronationalist and prodemocratic lines, or a public display
of xenophobic behaviors—nothing prepared us for the shock that came last
January when the Polish parliament passed amendments to the Polish law
concerning the Institute of National Remembrance. The law evoked an
international crisis. One controversial element was the criminalization of the
use of expressions like “Polish death camps.” But the real source of Polish and
international outcry lay in other injunctions, like the following:
1. Whoever
publicly and contrary to the facts attributes to the Polish Nation or to the
Polish State responsibility or co-responsibility for the Nazi crimes committed
by the German Third Reich..., or for any other offences constituting crimes
against peace, humanity or war crimes, or otherwise grossly diminishes the
responsibility of the actual perpetrators of these crimes, shall be liable to a
fine or deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years.... 2. If the perpetrator of
the act specified in section 1 above acts unintentionally, they shall be liable
to a fine or restriction of liberty.... [T]his Act shall be applicable to a
Polish citizen as well as a foreigner.
Critical
international reactions to this law have included official responses from
Israel, the United States and Ukraine. Meanwhile, public opinion in Poland has
remained deeply divided. In general, the ruling Law and Justice Party, known as
the PiS, as well as many Catholic bishops, supported the new law, seeing in it
a tool for defending against defamatory characterization of Poles as an
international “whipping boy” for anti-Semitism. This perspective focuses on the
offensiveness and incorrectness of the term “Polish death camp.” Those who were
critical of the law, on the other hand, including Catholic circles concentrated
around Tygodnik Powszechny, in which the future Pope John Paul II and his
fellow scholars published, point to the detrimental effects the law would have
on the future of Polish scholarship, education and public debate.
On June 27 the
Polish government unexpectedly backed down from the amendment. In a procedure
described as an “urgent project,” both houses of parliament did away with the
law within five hours. The president signed the change immediately afterward.
The lightning speed of this process, in which members of parliament had a
limited chance to ask questions, was probably due to a desire to appease Poland’s
most powerful ally. The dots are not difficult to connect. On his visit to the
United States in May, President Andrzej Duda was not invited to a meeting with
President Trump or Vice President Mike Pence. The Polish deputy prime minister
later acknowledged that the new law was blocking talks about American military
presence in Poland. During the July NATO summit in Brussels, however, President
Duda was able to secure an invitation to the White House, as well as American
promises of greater military presence in Poland and sale of military equipment.
On the same day as the removal of the amendment, the prime ministers of Poland
and Israel also signed a controversial joint statement about cooperation, in
which “anti-polonism” is mentioned on a par with anti-Semitism, a correlation
that has since gained severe criticism in Israel. The new version of the law
removed the threat of jail sentences and established that expressions perceived
as defamatory toward the Polish nation will become civil offenses, not criminal.
A Disturbing Reality
While the
change in law, even under pressure, was a positive development, the affair
revealed a disturbing reality about Polish society and its latent
anti-Semitism. The timing of the amendment, on the eve of the International Holocaust
Remembrance Day, only added to its incendiary effect. The amendment’s phrasing,
apart from major legislative flaws that would make it tortuous to apply,
demonstrated monumental myopia of historical reasoning. Past Polish leaders
have recognized the role the country played in the horrors of the Holocaust.
One of the earliest attributions of “co-responsibility” for Nazi crimes to the
“Polish Nation” was by no other than Jan Karski, courier of the Polish
Government-in-Exile, who tried in vain to alert the Allies to the annihilation
of Poland’s Jewish population. In a February 1940 report, he assessed Polish
attitudes toward the Jews as...
overwhelmingly severe, often without pity. A large percentage of them
are benefitting from the rights the new situation gives them. They frequently
exploit those rights and often abuse them. This brings them, to a certain
extent, nearer to the Germans.... “The solution of the Jewish Question” by the
Germans—I must state this with a full sense of responsibility for what I am
saying—is a serious and quite dangerous tool in the hands of the Germans,
leading toward “moral pacification” of broad sections of Polish
society...although the nation loathes them [the Germans] mortally, this
question is creating something akin to a narrow bridge upon which the Germans
and a large part of Polish society are finding agreement.
Ironically,
Karski—a national hero who, as a “man who tried to stop the Holocaust,” became
an icon for a certain Polish narrative in which Poles did all in their power to
save Jews but became a target of “anti-Polish” prejudice—could have been
imprisoned had the amendment not been changed.
This
possibility points to the conclusion that the new law was not really about the
semantics of “Polish death camps.” It was rather about muzzling the scholarly
research that has burgeoned in free Poland since the publication of Neighbors. Whatever one thinks
of Gross’s book, politicians have attempted to charge him with libel against
the Polish nation for publishing it, and the current president has attempted to
deprive Gross of the Order of Merit he received for outstanding scholarship in
1996, when he was widely hailed as a historian of safer topics, such as the
Polish society under German occupation or under Soviet rule. The amendment
represented the success of an anti-Gross narrative that sees him as a liar and
a traitor.
The final
report of the Institute of National Remembrance itself substantially confirmed
Gross’s basic finding concerning the participation of Poles in the massacre of
several hundred Jews in Jedwabne (while disputing Gross’s numbers), stating
that at least 40 Poles brutally murdered several hundred Jewish inhabitants of
the town, including women, children and even infants, with no more than a
passive, “inspirational” role ascribed to the Germans. A former president of
Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, a former prime minister, Jerzy Buzek, and a
number of Polish Catholic bishops have already acknowledged the guilt of these
Poles and have expressed their apologies for these acts committed by Poles.
Unfortunately,
political changes in the Institute of National Remembrance have now created a
different climate. Its current director, when he was interviewing for the
position, claimed—against the evidence and contrary to previous institute
findings—that the Jedwabne pogrom was executed by Germans forcing innocent
Poles, in fear for their lives, to kill their Jewish neighbors. His nomination
in 2016 coincided with a purge of precisely those historians who had been crucial
for deepening our knowledge of Polish behavior toward the Jews from the outset
of German-Soviet hostilities in 1941.
Recent actions
of the Law and Justice Party threaten to reverse the important academic
advances made in post-Communist Polish scholarship. Polish governmental
institutions have, I have learned, reneged on support for academic conferences
dealing with Polish-Jewish subjects, and Holocaust courses have been cancelled
at Polish universities. I have also heard that Polish academics are even refused
institutional and financial support to publish on Jewish history not directly
related to Polish-Jewish relations and are told, “It is not the right time.”
Both students and scholars, faced with such a hostile atmosphere, may decide
not to risk their academic careers by working on similar topics.
In the present
context, the mounting anti-Semitic demonstrations in Poland can no longer be
characterized as marginal. Events like the burning of Jews in effigy,
pro-fascist demonstrations and a massive neo-Nazi march during the recent
celebration of Polish Independence, are not normal signs of a functioning free
society. Although the government officially dissociates itself from such
demonstrations, it fails to signal that they lie outside of acceptable discourse,
even as it passed this new law regulating contrary speech. Government officials
downplayed the neo-Nazi march, but they prosecuted members of a countermarch.
If free speech is good for one side of an issue, why not for the other?
Even such
demonstrations, however, do not compare in their impact to the expressions of
certain government officials since the law was proposed. One presidential
advisor has claimed that Israel’s protest stems from a “feeling of shame at the
passivity of the Jews during the Holocaust.” The PiS has renewed its plans to
outlaw kosher slaughter, with a penalty of four years imprisonment. Prime
Minister Mateusz Morawiecki poured gasoline on the fire when, at the Munich
Security Conference, he answered a question from an Israeli journalist on
whether the new law would criminalize him for saying that his parents’ family
members were killed after their Polish neighbors reported them to the Germans.
Prime Minister Morawiecki replied, “You’re not going to be seen as criminal [if
you] say that there were Polish perpetrators, as there were Jewish
perpetrators, as there were Russian perpetrators as well as Ukrainian
perpetrators—not only German perpetrators.” This response was, understandably,
interpreted as a blurring of distinctions between perpetrators and victims and
relativizing—thus erasing—any responsibility that certain Poles had in the
elimination of their Jewish neighbors.
Expressions
like these convey a desire to whitewash the Polish national memory, erasing any
notion of complicity by Polish citizens in crimes against their fellow citizens
who happened to be Jews. There is also a not-so-subtle link between the vox populi and the party
in power. When President Duda received the new law to sign it, demonstrators
before the presidential palace brandished posters and shouted the following
slogans: “Stop the Jewish aggression against Poland!” “Enough, enough Jewish
lies!” and “Take off your yarmulka. Sign the law!”
Anti-Semitism
has also breached the mainstream media: Dr. Adam Sandauer, a Polish-Jewish
physicist and social activist, found it necessary to walk off the set of a
television talk show when he was ambushed with anti-Semitic canards by an
audience member, who was not stopped by the talk show hosts. Two other
television hosts have told “Holocaust jokes.” Written screeds have since
appeared in mainstream newspapers.
The increase
in public manifestations of anti-Semitism is not the only symptom of growing
hostile attitudes toward the other in Poland. Verbal attacks on foreigners tend
more often now to turn to violence, from which even children are not spared. A
14-year-old Turkish girl was beaten on the street while the attackers
were shouting “Poland for Poles!”Foreigners from
Africa or India are routinely insulted with the “n-word” and also physically
attacked. Crimes committed from racial prejudice are on a sharp rise. There were 835 cases in 2013,
1631 in 2016 and 947 in the first six months alone of 2017.
This is the
climate in which this new law sought to limit free speech and open debate that
was recently restored after Communism, a climate that is essential for Poles to
face a history in which they are not exclusively victims. The effects of the
law could have been not only long-term losses in scholarship. More ominous is
what it appeared to sanction in the public sphere: an outburst of unlimited
expressions of anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia that present to the Poles a
very unpleasant self-image.
Polish
historians already ask whether the situation is beginning to resemble the
1930s, with its anti-Jewish street violence, attempts to outlaw kosher
slaughter, numerus clausus and
press assaults on prominent Polish Jews, or, perhaps, 1968, with its
state-sponsored “anti-Zionist campaign,” but also with the popular social
exclusion of Jewish Poles. There are not many Jews left in Poland to harass or
expel, but what will happen to the Poles and to their soul as a “nation” as
anti-Semitism is left unchecked?
At Yad Vashem, the world Holocaust remembrance center, Pope John Paul II
remembered Poland’s Jews and warned the world to be attentive to their unique
suffering: “How can we fail to heed their cry? No one can forget or ignore what
happened. No one can diminish its scale.” We owe it to them to tell the whole
truth, not just that which certain Polish politicians find appealing to a
nationalist base.
This article also appeared in print, under the headline "Heroic and
Unheroic Poland," in the November 12, 2018 issue.
Monika Rice is director of the Holocaust and Genocide Studies Program at
Gratz College.